(Related to Article 1— “New York Fires Over 2,000 Prison Guards”):

For an interesting article regarding wildcat strikes and a comparison case study, please see the following article:

https://newlaborpress.org/2024/12/31/our-history-the-1970-postal-workers-wildcat-strike/

In the 1960s, like today, postal workers faced miserable working conditions and low wages. They worked through 100-degree days in the summer with no air conditioning and through below-freezing temperatures in the winter without heating, all in the midst of ever-increasing production speed-ups.

Postal workers struggled to pay rent and afford groceries for their families, along with other basic necessities, forcing many to work second and even third jobs despite working an incredibly physically intensive job as a mail carrier. Even though they were “unionized” by a plethora of state and craft unions, postal workers, as federal employees, had no collective bargaining rights, no ability to file grievances, and were barred from striking by a no-strike law that threatened immediate termination, heavy fines, felony charges, and prison sentences of up to one year for striking.

Legally, postal workers, at the time employees of the United States Post Office Department (USPOD), the predecessor to the United States Postal Service (USPS), were at the mercy of the federal government when it came to increases in wages or improvements in working conditions. Without the existing threat of collective action, the government had little incentive to increase wages. For nearly twenty years, from 1925 to 1943, postal workers saw no raises.

Postal workers had become increasingly agitated at their abysmal pay and working conditions throughout the late 1960s. In June of 1969, 2,000 postal workers marched in New York in opposition to an executive order issued by President Richard Nixon that denied a planned 4 percent raise for postal workers. The next month, at the Kingsbridge station in the Bronx, New York, 72 postal workers organized a sickout, and when they were suspended the next day, an additional 16 joined at another Bronx station. The sickout exposed the character of the leadership of the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC); unlike the Manhattan Bronx Postal Union (MBPU), NALC Branch 36 President Gus Johnson refused to reimburse the pay of those who participated in the sickout.

Rank-and-file anger at Branch 36, sparked by Gus Johnson’s refusal to reimburse suspended union members, soared after it was announced that James Rademacher, national president of the NALC, had been engaging in secret talks with President Nixon behind the backs of rank-and-file postal workers. When Nixon announced that the wages of all mail carriers would be frozen until January of 1971, 400 rank-and-file postal workers at a membership meeting for Branch 36 voted to go on strike by March 15th, in opposition to branch president Gus Johnson, who protested by negating the decision and forced a delay by ordering a “strike survey” before any action could be taken. On March 17th, despite further protests from Johnson, a strike vote was held in which those in favor of a strike won by 500 votes.

In defiance of the federal law which stated they could serve a year in prison and protests from their own union leadership, on March 18th, 1970, at 1 a.m., 30 postal workers from Branch 36 began their strike at the Grand Central Station Post Office in Manhattan, New York. By morning, the call to strike proved to be a success as 9,700 mail carriers from Branch 36, amounting to 97 percent of the workforce, refused to show up to work and hundreds picketed outside several post offices. News of the strike spread quickly and rank-and-file postal workers in other parts of New York initiated spontaneous strike votes of their own. By the end of the day, pickets had been launched outside post offices in all five boroughs of New York and even into New Jersey and Connecticut. The next day, it spread further as postal workers in Philadelphia and other cities in the Northeast voted to go on strike.

Throughout the strike, NALC president James Rademacher further exposed himself as a sellout and class traitor. Following the breakout of the strike, he sent a message to Branch 36 that if they did not return to work, the locals would be expelled—an order Branch President Gus Johnson attempted to carry out, pleading with strikers to end the strike to no avail. On March 20th, Rademacher and the government announced that they would consider the strikers’ demands if they returned to work promptly. The rank and file refused, labeling Rademacher a “rat,” and in Manhattan, a sign reading “Hang Rat-emacher” was seen next to an effigy of Rademacher with a noose around his neck. The strike continued to grow, and across the nation, rank-and-file mail carriers were refusing to work despite protests and threats from union leadership and the government. By March 21st, the strike had now grown to encompass more than 200 cities and towns, including major cities such as Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Minneapolis, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. By now, at least 200,000 postal workers were on strike, making it the largest wildcat strike in U.S. history.

President Nixon had given up on Rademacher ending the strike for him. The country’s mail service had been nearly entirely shut down, and the strike threatened to ignite a fire that could spread into other federal workplaces. On March 23rd, Nixon called a state of emergency and sent 25,000 troops to New York City to prevent paralysis of the economy and as a threat to other federal employees who may have been planning wildcat strikes of their own. The troops proved incapable of meeting the standards set by the mail carriers, performing the job miserably, and in some instances, soldiers who were sympathetic to the strike defied orders and actively sabotaged the effort.

Quickly, however, without an organized strike effort or plan, individual branches, under the pressure of their union and the government of losing their employment, began to return to work. By March 25th, New York City was the last city on strike. Word was passed down to the picketers that Nixon and Rademacher were willing to agree to a 12 percent raise, health benefits, the right to collectively bargain, and other concessions if they returned to work. On March 26th, New York City mail carriers ended the strike and returned to work.

The historic strike was a relative economic success; prior backroom deals between Nixon and Rademacher would have included only a 5 percent raise and would not have allowed for the right to collectively bargain. These wins would not last long, however, as without established rank-and-file-led shop floor organizations built, the momentum did not sustain itself. Soon many of the leaders of the 1970 strike, such as Vincent Sombrotto, would be bought off by the same bribes and concessions that they labeled the union’s leadership “rats” for. Postal workers now with USPS have not been on strike since 1970, and today USPS rank-and-file workers are rallying against a tentative agreement signed between NALC leadership and USPS, which would include a mere 1.3 percent raise.

Despite its failure to deliver long-term results for postal workers, the March 1970 wildcat strike remains an example of the ability of workers to act in defiance of the law or union leadership’s support.